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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper investigates the relationships between non-audit services, audit fee, audit hours and accounting quality. 
Previous studies have not provided consistent results for how simultaneous provision of audit and non-audit 
services by an independent auditor to a client company affects the audit quality. In addition, further studies have 
identified endogeneity in research method as the primary reason. Therefore, this study analyzed audit quality 
comprehensively using empirical analysis on data specific to Korea. This study employs research methods 
contrasting with existing studies in order to present a solution for the controversy related to the endogeneity from 
the effects of non-audit service provided by an independent auditor on audit quality. This study used audit 
compensation and abnormal accruals variables simultaneously, and audit time variable includes empirical data 
from Korean clients for comprehensive analysis. Study results found that the non-audit service significantly affects 
audit service quality before controlling for endogeneity. However, after controlling for endogeneity, even when the 
same independent auditor provides audit and non-audit services together, it did not affect the accounting quality.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
any studies have examined how audit quality is affected by an independent auditor providing audit 
and non-audit services together. However, the conclusions of these previous studies are not 
consistent, and various interpretations have been suggested for the relevance between audit service 
and non-audit service provision. Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson (2002) used abnormal accruals as an alternative 
variable of audit quality, and found that audit quality deteriorated as economic fee dependence is increased when 
both audit service and non-audit service are provided together. On the contrary, further study results have found no 
relevance from abnormal accruals when both audit and non-audit services are provided together (Ashbaugh, LaFond 
and Mayhew, 2003; Chung and Kallapur, 2003). Moreover, studies featuring audit compensation used as an 
alternative variable of audit quality found that if an independent auditor provides both audit and non-audit services, 
the audit service is increased, and therefore the impartiality of the independent auditor is not compromised even 
when non-audit service is simultaneously provided (Simunic, 1984; Palmrose, 1986). 
 
Since there is no consensus concerning the relevance between audit service and non-audit service provided from the 
same auditor, many researchers have examined potential reasons, and have focused on the endogeneity of the 
research design as a possible factor. Whisenant, Sankaraguruswamy, and Raghunandan (2003) identified that the 
study result of Simunic (1984) and Palmrose (1986), which argues that audit compensation would be increased if 
both audit service and non-audit service are provided simultaneously, contained potential errors caused by the 
endogenous variable from regression analysis (OLS)1. Moreover, as a result of multiple regression analysis using 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) in order to control the impact of such endogenous variables, it was verified that there 
is no relevance between audit service compensation and non-audit service compensation. 
                                                
1 Some subsequent studies disclosed that the results of existing studies are caused by endogeneity. For example, the study of Lawrence et al. 
(2011) found out that the study result of Becker et al. (1998) which states that the audit quality of Big 4 is relatively excellent was erroneous due 
to self-selection bias. They used matching model research method to control endogeneity, and as a result, Becker et al. (1998) verified that the 
audit quality is different because unique characteristics of companies under independent audit of Big 4 and non-Big 4, more specifically, the size 
of companies is fundamentally different rather than because the size of auditor is different. 
M 
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However, despite the argument of Whisenant et al. (2003), the relevance between non-audit service and audit service 
is still not clearly defined due to endogeneity and the alternative variables of audit quality. Therefore, this study 
expands the literature and comprehensively analyzes how the non-audit service provided from the same independent 
auditor affects the quality of audit service by applying empirical analysis and new research methods. Among the 
differentiated factors specified in this study, is that alternative variables measuring the quality of audit service are 
comprehensively examined. Existing research has analyzed the effects of non-audit service on the audit service 
quality, while either audit compensation or abnormal accruals was fragmentarily used as an alternative variable of 
audit quality. In comparison, this study uses audit compensation and abnormal accruals variables simultaneously, as 
well as audit time disclosed by clients in Korea. 
 
The second differentiated factor in this study is the utilization of a more elaborate study method than previous 
studies in order to control endogenous variables. Most prior studies, including Whisenant et al. (2003), have used 
regression analysis by employing two-stage least squares (2SLS) for companies which received non-audit service, as 
well as companies which did not receive non-audit service, in order to control the effect of endogenous variables. 
Further studies have used regression analysis to compose fair-matched sample based on variables specific to 
companies. However, these methods cannot completely control the influence of self-selection bias on study samples. 
Therefore, this study conducted research on companies which received non-audit service in order to prevent 
discretionary factors in selecting samples and ensuring homogeneity of samples. Specifically, if a company received 
non-audit service at least once from the same independent auditor during the verification period, the effect of non-
audit service was analyzed by comparing audit service quality variables between years the non-audit service was 
provided and years with no non-audit service provided. 
 
This study has important findings since it used variables and research methods which have not been used in previous 
studies. In particular, this study uses audit time data from Korea, and compared audit quality before and after non-
audit service is provided for companies which have received non-audit service in order to control endogeneity. 
Results of this study are meaningful since it can suggest important policies to regulate simultaneous provision of 
non-audit and audit services by the same independent auditor. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Previous studies have mainly focused on the independence of the auditor. Specifically, study results support the 
meaningful relationship between non-audit compensation and abnormal accruals (Frankel et al. 2002) and 
correlation between unspecified non-audit service and re-preparation of financial statements (Kinney, Palmrose, and 
Scholz  2004) suggest that the simultaneous provision of non-audit service may negatively affect the accounting 
quality for client companies. Specifically, the economic association between auditor and client companies from the 
simultaneous provision of non-audit service likely compromises the independence of the auditor, and this may 
negatively affect the accounting quality for client companies. 
 
Conversely, Antle, Gordon, Narayanamoorthy, and Zhou (2006) found a significant negative relationship between 
non-audit compensation and abnormal accruals, and asserted that non-audit service may improve the accounting 
quality of client companies. This can be based on knowledge spillover due to simultaneous provision of audit and 
non-audit service (Simunic 1984). 
 
However, DeFond, Raghunandan, and Subramanyam (2002) found an insignificant relationship between uncertain 
opinion on going concern and non-audit compensation (rate) and argued that the independence of auditor and non-
audit service is not relevant. In particular, a number of studies show that abnormal accruals are not relevant to non-
audit service (Chung and Kallapur 2003; Ashbaugh et al. 2003) and is contrary to the study of Frankel et al. (2002). 
In other words, while auditors can obtain additional benefits from non-audit service, they are also exposed to the 
loss of reputation due to compromised independence. 
 
Previous studies on the simultaneous provision of non-audit service consist of three predominant viewpoints; audit 
quality is affected negatively, positively, or not related. In addition, the basis of these studies are compromised 
independence due to economic relationship (negative), knowledge spillover (positive) and loss of reputation (not 
related). This can be explained as audit quality composed of uncovering probability and reporting probability 
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(DeAngelo 1981). That means, the effects of two factors will be likely found in combination as the compromised 
independence derives from decreased reporting probability and the knowledge spillover increases uncovering 
probability2. 
 
As audit (input) time and audit compensation are applied to the relationship between, the following assumptions can 
be expected: First of all, when audit and non-audit services are simultaneously provided, the audit time may be the 
same or less than when on-audit service is not provided. If simultaneous provision of non-audit service compromises 
the independence of auditor, the auditor will receive no benefit from uncovering accounting errors (wrongdoing) due 
to the relatively low report probability. Furthermore, since a more efficient audit is possible through knowledge 
spillover effects from non-audit service, it is unlikely that additional audit time is required. In addition, considering 
that audit compensation is determined mainly based on audit time provided, the audit compensation in the case 
where non-audit service is provided simultaneously may be the same or less compared to the case in which non-
audit service is not provided. 
 
The estimation based on accruals (DA), audit time and audit compensation are mostly used as alternatives of audit 
quality. Specifically, when examining audit quality based on the simultaneous provision of non-audit service, the 
inconsistent results of previous studies may result from the endogeneity of audit and non-audit service rather than 
measurement error of audit time, audit compensation and abnormal accruals (Lawrence, Minutti-Meza, and Zhang 
2011)3. Therefore, it is necessary to control the endogeneity in order to effectively examine the effects of the non-
audit service. Therefore, verification utilizes endogeneity control after null hypotheses are established as follows:  
 
Hypothesis: There is no difference in audit quality between companies which receive non-audit service and 
companies which do not receive non-audit service. 
 
Hypothesis 1-1: There is no difference in (provided) audit time between companies which receive non-audit service 
and companies which do not receive non-audit service. 
 
Hypothesis 1-2: There is no difference in audit compensation between companies which receive non-audit service 
and companies which do not receive non-audit service. 
 
Hypothesis 1-3: There is no difference in abnormal accruals between companies which receive non-audit service 
and companies which do not receive non-audit service. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Research Model  
 
Methods for controlling endogeneity include the Heckman selection model (2SLS), the propensity score matching 
technique, the before and after comparison method, and the paired t-test. Lawrence et al. (2011) argued that studies 
should utilize the propensity score matching technique, which is an advanced version of the paried t-test, since the 
Heckman selection model cannot control endogeneity effectively. However, since the propensity score matching 
technique analyze endogeneity by finding similar paired sample, if there is no proper substitution sample, the result 
may be distorted and it will face variable selection issues. Moreover, although there are many differences in audit 
compensation and audit time according to industry characteristics, the propensity score matching technique does not 
match similar samples in the same industry. Therefore, the before and after comparison method is the most 
reasonable method to analyze the effect of non-audit service. Accordingly, this study compares audit compensation, 
audit time and audit quality by years for the companies which received non-audit service at least once according to 
the before and after comparison method.  
  
                                                
2 At this time, the reputation of auditor is 'acknowledged' audit quality, so if the loss of reputation is bigger than benefits from non-audit service, it 
likely increases the report probability. 
3 Simunic (1984) argues that the knowledge spillover effect can be through non-audit service. According to this, since more efficient audit is 
possible due to the knowledge spillover effect from non-audit service, we may expect less audit hour and less audit compensation. However, 
empirical results show that more audit compensation is given when non-audit service is provided. 
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The research model the 1-1 and 1-2 hypotheses of this study as follows: 
 𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐹%& = 𝛼) + 𝛼+𝑙𝑛𝑁𝐴𝑆𝐹𝐸𝐸 𝑁𝐴𝑆/ %& + 𝛼0𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑇%& + 𝛼4𝑅𝑂𝐴%&6+ + 𝛼7𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆%&6+ + 𝛼9𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸%&6+ +𝛼;𝐿𝐸𝑉%&6+ + 𝛼=𝐺𝑅𝑊%&6+ + 𝛼@𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂%&6+ + 𝛼C𝐿𝐼𝑄%&6+ + 𝛼+)𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐴𝑅%&6+ + 𝛼++𝑀𝐵%&6+ +𝛼+0𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅%& + 𝛼+4𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐺𝐼%& + 𝛼+7𝐵𝐼𝐺4%& + 𝛼+9𝑂𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑂%&6+ + 𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝑌𝐷 + 𝑒 (1) 
 
 𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑇%& = 𝛽) + 𝛽+𝑙𝑛𝑁𝐴𝑆𝐹𝐸𝐸 𝑁𝐴𝑆 𝐷)%& + 𝛽0𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑇%& + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴%&6+ + 𝛽7𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆%&6+ + 𝛽9𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸%&6+ +𝛽;𝐿𝐸𝑉%&6+ + 𝛽=𝐺𝑅𝑊%&6+ + 𝛽@𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂%&6+ + 𝛽C𝐿𝐼𝑄%&6+ + 𝛽+)𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐴𝑅%&6+ + 𝛽++𝑀𝐹%&6+ +𝛽+0𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅%& + 𝛽+4𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐺𝐼%& + 𝛽+7𝐵𝐼𝐹4%& + 𝛽+9𝑂𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑂%&6+ + 𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝑌𝐷 + 𝑒 (2) 
 
lnAF:  The natural logarithm of audit fee; 
lnAT:  The natural logarithm of audit hour; 
lnNASFEE:  The natural logarithm of non-audit service fee; 
NAS_D:  1 if non-audit service and 0 otherwise; 
FIRST:  1 if first audit and 0 otherwise; 
ROA:  Net Income divided by beginning total assets; 
LOSS:  1 if a firm reports loss and 0 otherwise; 
SIZE:  The natural logarithm of total assets; 
LEV:  Total liabilities divided by beginning total assets; 
GRW:  Sales divided by beginning sales; 
EXPRATIO:  International sales divided by sales; 
LIQ:  Current assets divided by current liabilities 
INVAR:  Receivables and inventory divided by total assets; 
MB:  Market value divided by book value; 
OWNER:  Ownership of largest shareholder and related parties; 
FORGI:  Foreign ownership; 
BIG4:  1 if auditor is a large auditor (called Big 4) and 0 otherwise; 
OPINO:  1 if audit opinion is clean and 0 otherwise; 
IND:  Industry dummy 
YD:  Year dummy 
 
The variables of interest in this study include lnNASFEE (non-audit service fee) and NAS_D (non-audit service). If 
endogeneity is controlled, there is no significant relationship between lnAT (audit time), and lnAF (audit fee) and 
lnNASFEE. Therefore, we predict α1 and β1 to be not significant in support of Hypothesis 1-1 and Hypothesis 1-2. 
We include control variables (FIRST, ROA, LOSS, SIZE, LEV, GRW, EXPRATIO, LIQ, INVAR, MB, OWNER, 
FORGI, BIG4, OPINO) consistent with Frankel et al. (2002) and Ashbaugh et al. (2003). 
 
We estimate the relationship between the audit quality and non-audit service using Equation (3): 
 𝐷𝐴%& = 𝛾) + 𝛾+𝑙𝑛𝑁𝐴𝑆𝐹𝐸𝐸(𝑁𝐴𝑆/)%& + 𝛾0𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸%& + 𝛾4𝐿𝐸𝑉%& + 𝛾7𝐺𝑅𝑊%& + 𝛾9𝑀𝐵%& + 𝛾;𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅%& +𝛾=𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐺𝐼%& + 𝛾@𝐵𝐼𝐺4%& + 𝛾C𝐾𝑂𝑆𝑃𝐼%&6+ + 𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝑌𝐷 + 𝑒 (3) 
 
DA: Discretionary accruals; 
KOSPI:  1 if firms are listed in KOSPI and 0 otherwise; 
 
Following previous studies, we use the discretionary accruals (DA) as our proxy for audit quality (e.g., Dechow , 
Sloan, and Sweeny 1995). We use a cross-sectional version of the modified Jones model. Furthermore, we utilize a 
cross-sectional model of discretionary accruals in which each year we estimate the model for every industry by its 
Kis-code. We expect that there is no significant relationship between audit quality and non-audit service. Therefore, 
we predict γ1 to be not significant in support of Hypothesis 1-3. We include control variables (SIZE, LEV, GRW, 
MB, OWNER, FORGI, BIG4, KOSPI) as in Lawrence et al. (2011). 
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Selection of Sample 
 
We analyze the listed companies on the KOSPI and KOSDAQ from 2003 to 2014. We select those companies which 
meet the following conditions. 
 
(1) Companies listed in KOSPI from 2002 to 2012 
(2) Non-financial companies 
(3) Companies which close their books in December 
(4) Companies with data available for the analysis of KIS-VALUE and TS-2000 
(5) Companies which present audit time in hours. 
(6) Companies which belong to more than 10 industries by medium classification level 
(7) Companies without impaired capital, not under administration, and not delisted 
 
The data for non-audit service, audit compensation, and audit time is collected by using TS-2000. Moreover, 
companies which represent audit time in days or months rather than hours were excluded. In addition, companies 
which belong to less than 10 industries were not included in order to find abnormal accruals. The initial sample size, 
not controlling for endogeneity, is 11,578 observations (sample 2).  
 
This study used before and after comparison method to control for endogeneity. The number of samples selected to 
use the before and after comparison method was 2,167 (sample 1). 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 
 
Table 1, Panel A shows descriptive statistics for the variables included in research models for sample 1. The mean 
NAS_D is 53.45% and the mean of lnNASFEE is 9.1053. The mean of lnAF is 18.0467 and lnAT is 6.6936. Table 1, 
Panel B provides descriptive statistics for the variables included in research models for sample 2. For sample 2, the 
mean NAS_D is 28.95% and the mean of lnNASFEE is 4.8669. 
 
Table 2, Panel A shows the Pearson correlation among the variables used in the research model for sample 1. The 
variable NAS_D shows no significance with the variables lnAF, lnAT, and DA. However, Panel B displays that the 
variable NAS_D shows a significant negative correlation at 1% significance level with variables lnAF, lnAT, and DA.  
 
Results for the Study Hypotheses 
 
Table 3 provides the results of Equation (1) for testing hypothesis 1-1. The results reveal no significant relationships 
between non-audit services fee (lnNASF), non-audit services (NAS_D), and audit fee (lnAF) for sample 1 
(controlling for endogeneity). However, the non-audit services fee, non-audit services, and audit hour have a 
significant positive correlation in sample 2 (non-controlling for endogeneity). 
Table 4 provides the results of Equation (2) for testing hypothesis 1-2. Consistent with hypothesis 1-2, the results 
reveal no significant relationship between non-audit services fee (lnNASF), non-audit services (NAS_D), and audit 
fee (lnAT) for sample 1 (Controlling for endogeneity). However, the non-audit services fee, non-audit services, and 
audit hour have a significant positive correlation in sample 2 (non-controlling for endogeneity). 
Table 5 reports the results of Equation (3) for testing hypothesis 1-3. We find that the coefficients on lnNASF and 
NAS_D are not significant for the second and third columns, which shows Equation (3) using sample 1. However, 
we find a positive relationship between DA, lnNASF, and NAS_D. We find evidence generally supporting hypothesis 
1-3. 
  
The Journal of Applied Business Research – March/April 2017 Volume 33, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 314 The Clute Institute 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A. n=2157 
Variables Mean Std. Min 1Q Median 3Q Max 
lnAFt 18.0467 0.6450 16.9066 17.5997 17.9426 18.3264 20.0693 
lnATt 6.6936 0.7153 4.9698 6.2146 6.5889 7.0901 8.8247 
DAt -0.0046 0.1066 -0.3834 -0.0522 -0.0019 0.0440 0.3359 
lnNASF 9.1053 8.5514 0.0000 0.0000 15.2018 17.2167 19.8070 
NAS_Dt 0.5345 0.4989 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
SIZEt 25.7073 1.4006 23.2414 24.7111 25.4392 26.4828 30.0319 
LEVt 0.4093 0.1955 0.0406 0.2552 0.4101 0.5577 0.8664 
GRWt 1.1220 0.4072 0.3078 0.9371 1.0670 1.2031 3.2955 
MBt 1.4036 1.3641 0.1683 0.6086 0.9779 1.6807 8.8459 
ROAt 0.0103 0.1200 -0.5898 -0.0013 0.0322 0.0683 0.2266 
ROAt-1  0.0155 0.1193 -0.5504 0.0030 0.0362 0.0749 0.2225 
LOSSt-1  0.2388 0.4264 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
SIZEt-1  25.6087 1.4080 23.0097 24.6205 25.3443 26.4007 29.8651 
LEVt-1  0.4094 0.1971 0.0504 0.2555 0.4086 0.5530 0.8863 
GRWt-1  1.1337 0.3994 0.3200 0.9461 1.0772 1.2278 3.0476 
EXPRATIOt-1  0.2868 0.3159 0.0000 0.0001 0.1407 0.5485 0.9907 
LIQt-1  2.6437 3.2509 0.2220 1.0627 1.6191 2.8020 23.8370 
INVARt-1  0.2802 0.1568 0.0000 0.1601 0.2667 0.3918 0.6696 
MVt-1  1.3452 1.2954 0.1356 0.5641 0.9324 1.6537 8.3174 
OWNERt-1 0.2671 0.1366 0.0498 0.1629 0.2388 0.3483 0.6617 
FORGIt-1 0.0690 0.1165 0.0000 0.0016 0.0141 0.0837 0.5535 
FIRSTt-1 0.1669 0.3730 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
BIG4t-1 0.6078 0.4884 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
OPINOt-1 0.9977 0.0481 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
KOSPIt 0.4483 0.4974 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 
Panel B. n=11578 
Variables Mean Std. Min 1Q Median 3Q Max 
lnAFt 18.0058 0.6417 16.8112 17.5958 17.9099 18.2582 20.2124 
lnATt 6.6663 0.7213 4.7185 6.2146 6.5765 7.0049 8.9872 
DAt -0.0036 0.0998 -0.3520 -0.0502 -0.0013 0.0449 0.3043 
lnNASF 4.8669 7.6628 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 15.4249 19.9054 
NAS_Dt 0.2895 0.4536 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
SIZEt 25.6612 1.3582 23.2805 24.7398 25.3954 26.3203 30.2485 
LEVt 0.4086 0.1963 0.0404 0.2518 0.4081 0.5553 0.8779 
GRWt 1.1049 0.3572 0.3342 0.9380 1.0590 1.1968 2.9226 
MBt 1.3333 1.2299 0.1848 0.5976 0.9500 1.5937 7.7098 
ROAt 0.0122 0.1140 -0.5681 -0.0007 0.0308 0.0678 0.2128 
ROAt-1  0.0177 0.1133 -0.5504 0.0030 0.0342 0.0739 0.2235 
LOSSt-1  0.2345 0.4237 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
SIZEt-1  25.5854 1.3616 23.2381 24.6572 25.3218 26.2473 30.1817 
LEVt-1  0.4071 0.1952 0.0433 0.2517 0.4057 0.5520 0.8751 
GRWt-1  1.1296 0.4001 0.3405 0.9483 1.0704 1.2147 3.3131 
EXPRATIOt-1  0.2699 0.3054 0.0000 0.0001 0.1285 0.5005 0.9865 
LIQt-1  2.5703 2.9318 0.2541 1.0514 1.5931 2.7697 19.2912 
INVARt-1  0.2782 0.1541 0.0000 0.1633 0.2670 0.3811 0.6785 
MVt-1  1.3051 1.1964 0.1757 0.5806 0.9343 1.5808 7.4121 
OWNERt-1 0.2693 0.1382 0.0474 0.1655 0.2422 0.3482 0.6999 
FORGIt-1 0.0633 0.1123 0.0000 0.0014 0.0114 0.0692 0.5613 
FIRSTt-1 0.1540 0.3610 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
BIG4t-1 0.5449 0.4980 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
OPINOt-1 0.9977 0.0482 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
KOSPIt 0.4222 0.4939 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
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Table 2. Correlation Matrix 
Panel A. Correlation Matrix for Sample 1 (n=2,157) 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11 V12 
lnAFt (V1) 1.00             
lnATt (V2) 0.82  1.00            
DAt (V3) -0.02  -0.01  1.00           
lnNASFt (V4) 0.06  0.06  0.00  1.00          
NAS_Dt (V5) 0.02  0.03  0.00  0.99  1.00         
SIZEt (V6) 0.81  0.74  0.03  0.05  0.02  1.00        
LEVt (V7) 0.29  0.21  -0.05  0.01  0.00  0.26  1.00       
GRWt (V8) -0.04  -0.06  0.09  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  0.07  1.00      
MVt (V9) -0.01  -0.03  -0.04  0.02  0.02  -0.16  0.09  0.10  1.00     
ROAt (V10) 0.07  0.08  0.41  0.01  0.01  0.23  -0.23  0.15  -0.12  1.00    
ROAt-1 (V11) 0.07  0.08  0.04  -0.02  -0.02  0.22  -0.16  -0.04  -0.13  0.51  1.00   
LOSSt-1 (V12) -0.11  -0.11  -0.08  -0.03  -0.02  -0.23  0.15  0.04  0.13  -0.45  -0.72  1.00  
SIZEt-1 (V13) 0.82  0.75  0.00  0.05  0.02  0.98  0.26  -0.09  -0.18  0.19  0.20  -0.21  
LEVt-1 (V14) 0.30  0.21  -0.01  0.01  0.00  0.26  0.85  0.02  0.07  -0.14  -0.26  0.21  
GRWt-1 (V15) -0.01  -0.04  -0.07  0.00  -0.01  0.01  0.05  0.01  0.10  0.08  0.19  -0.14  
EXPRATIOt-1 (V16) 0.01  0.02  -0.02  -0.01  -0.01  0.03  0.05  -0.04  -0.01  0.03  0.04  0.01  
LIQt-1 (V17) -0.21  -0.15  -0.02  -0.01  0.00  -0.21  -0.50  -0.01  -0.01  0.02  0.10  -0.07  
INVARt-1 (V18) -0.16  -0.16  -0.02  -0.03  -0.02  -0.16  0.15  -0.03  -0.04  0.07  0.07  -0.10  
MVt-1 (V19) 0.01  -0.02  0.06  0.02  0.02  -0.11  0.04  0.18  0.60  -0.05  -0.07  0.07  
OWNERt-1 (V20) -0.02  0.01  0.03  0.01  0.01  0.04  -0.08  -0.04  -0.10  0.15  0.14  -0.12  
FORGIt-1 (V21) 0.36  0.33  0.04  0.02  0.00  0.39  -0.06  -0.01  0.08  0.18  0.17  -0.16  
FIRSTt-1 (V22) -0.03  0.00  0.01  -0.04  -0.03  0.01  0.00  0.07  0.04  0.02  -0.04  0.05  
BIG4t-1 (V23) 0.39  0.46  0.01  0.04  0.01  0.37  0.05  -0.05  -0.02  0.10  0.10  -0.13  
OPINOt-1 (V24) -0.05  -0.03  -0.05  -0.03  -0.03  -0.01  -0.02  0.04  -0.10  -0.01  0.00  -0.02  
KOSPIt (V25) 0.43  0.40  0.01  0.01  -0.01  0.54  0.12  -0.07  -0.19  0.04  0.03  -0.08  
 
Panel A continued 
 V13 V14 V15 V16 V17 V18 V19 V20 V21 V22 V23 V24 V25 
SIZEt-1 (V13) 1.00              
LEVt-1 (V14) 0.26  1.00             
GRWt-1 (V15) -0.01  0.07  1.00            
EXPRATIOt-1 (V16) 0.03  0.04  0.01  1.00           
LIQt-1 (V17) -0.21  -0.58  -0.07  -0.04  1.00          
INVARt-1 (V18) -0.17  0.17  0.10  0.02  -0.16  1.00         
MVt-1 (V19) -0.15  0.10  0.13  0.01  -0.01  -0.04  1.00        
OWNERt-1 (V20) 0.04  -0.08  -0.03  -0.07  0.10  0.00  -0.09  1.00       
FORGIt-1 (V21) 0.38  -0.06  -0.01  0.00  0.04  -0.12  0.07  0.07  1.00      
FIRSTt-1 (V22) -0.01  0.02  0.00  0.01  -0.01  -0.01  0.05  -0.01  0.01  1.00     
BIG4t-1 (V23) 0.37  0.04  0.00  0.01  -0.04  -0.08  0.00  0.11  0.27  0.00  1.00    
OPINOt-1 (V24) -0.01  -0.02  -0.03  0.00  0.01  0.01  -0.01  -0.03  -0.07  0.02  0.00  1.00   
KOSPIt (V25) 0.55  0.14  -0.08  -0.05  -0.12  -0.07  -0.20  0.03  0.24  0.01  0.24  -0.03  1.00  
(Table 2, Panel B continued on next page) 
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(Table 2, Panel B continued) 
 
Panel B. Correlation Matrix for Sample 2 (n=11,578) 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11 V12 
lnAFt (V1) 1.00             
lnATt (V2) 0.80  1.00            
DAt (V3) -0.05  -0.04  1.00           
lnNASFt (V4) 0.26  0.25  -0.02  1.00          
NAS_Dt (V5) 0.22  0.22  -0.02  1.00  1.00         
SIZEt (V6) 0.81  0.74  0.00  0.23  0.19  1.00        
LEVt (V7) 0.22  0.16  -0.07  0.00  -0.01  0.20  1.00       
GRWt (V8) -0.04  -0.05  0.10  0.01  0.01  -0.02  0.05  1.00      
MVt (V9) 0.06  0.03  -0.05  0.05  0.04  -0.10  0.07  0.10  1.00     
ROAt (V10) 0.05  0.06  0.40  0.06  0.06  0.20  -0.28  0.19  -0.10  1.00    
ROAt-1 (V11) 0.06  0.07  0.02  0.06  0.05  0.20  -0.24  -0.05  -0.10  0.50  1.00   
LOSSt-1 (V12) -0.06  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.04  -0.18  0.20  0.04  0.11  -0.42  -0.71  1.00  
SIZEt-1 (V13) 0.81  0.74  -0.03  0.22  0.19  0.99  0.20  -0.08  -0.11  0.14  0.17  -0.16  
LEVt-1 (V14) 0.24  0.18  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.21  0.88  0.01  0.06  -0.16  -0.29  0.22  
GRWt-1 (V15) -0.02  -0.03  -0.02  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.01  0.08  0.10  0.19  -0.16  
EXPRATIOt-1 (V16) 0.07  0.07  -0.02  0.03  0.02  0.07  0.05  -0.01  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.02  
LIQt-1 (V17) -0.21  -0.17  0.01  0.01  0.02  -0.21  -0.56  -0.01  0.03  0.07  0.12  -0.07  
INVARt-1 (V18) -0.17  -0.17  0.00  -0.08  -0.07  -0.16  0.17  -0.03  -0.07  0.09  0.09  -0.09  
MVt-1 (V19) 0.07  0.04  0.01  0.05  0.04  -0.07  0.02  0.11  0.67  -0.04  -0.07  0.07  
OWNERt-1 (V20) 0.00  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.05  -0.02  -0.01  -0.06  0.13  0.12  -0.09  
FORGIt-1 (V21) 0.44  0.38  -0.01  0.19  0.17  0.46  -0.10  -0.01  0.11  0.18  0.18  -0.15  
FIRSTt-1 (V22) -0.05  -0.01  0.00  -0.04  -0.04  -0.02  0.01  0.03  0.00  -0.01  -0.05  0.03  
BIG4t-1 (V23) 0.38  0.43  0.00  0.19  0.17  0.36  0.03  -0.02  -0.01  0.09  0.10  -0.09  
OPINOt-1 (V24) 0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.02  -0.04  0.03  -0.01  0.04  0.03  -0.03  
KOSPIt (V25) 0.43  0.40  0.01  0.14  0.12  0.55  0.10  -0.07  -0.17  0.08  0.06  -0.09  
 
(Panel B continued) 
 V13 V14 V15 V16 V17 V18 V19 V20 V21 V22 V23 V24 V25 
SIZEt-1 (V13) 1.00              
LEVt-1 (V14) 0.22  1.00             
GRWt-1 (V15) -0.02  0.04  1.00            
EXPRATIOt-1 (V16) 0.07  0.05  0.01  1.00           
LIQt-1 (V17) -0.22  -0.62  -0.03  -0.01  1.00          
INVARt-1 (V18) -0.17  0.19  0.08  0.03  -0.14  1.00         
MVt-1 (V19) -0.09  0.06  0.11  0.01  0.04  -0.08  1.00        
OWNERt-1 (V20) 0.04  -0.02  -0.01  -0.06  0.04  0.02  -0.06  1.00       
FORGIt-1 (V21) 0.46  -0.09  0.01  0.01  0.03  -0.13  0.11  0.02  1.00      
FIRSTt-1 (V22) -0.03  0.01  -0.01  -0.02  0.00  -0.01  0.03  0.00  -0.03  1.00     
BIG4t-1 (V23) 0.37  0.04  -0.01  0.02  -0.06  -0.09  0.00  0.09  0.24  -0.05  1.00    
OPINOt-1 (V24) 0.01  -0.02  0.00  -0.01  0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  0.01  0.02  1.00   
KOSPIt (V25) 0.56  0.12  -0.06  -0.02  -0.16  -0.04  -0.17  0.04  0.26  0.00  0.24  0.00  1.00  
1) The lower triangle presents the Pearson correlation coefficients. Boldfaced figures are statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
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Table 3. Results of Hypothesis 1-1 
 Controlling for endogeneity 
(Sample 1) 
Non-controlling for endogeneity 
(Sample 2) 
 Coefficient 
(t-stat.) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat.) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat.) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat.) 
Intercept 9.3204
*** 9.3255*** 8.9186*** 8.8817*** 
(38.47) (38.45) (85.11) (84.78) 
lnNASF 0.0007  0.0050
***  
(0.74)  (11.53)  
NAS_D  0.0024  0.0718
*** 
 (0.15)  (9.89) 
FIRST -0.0667
*** -0.0670*** -0.0531*** -0.0538*** 
(-3.32) (-3.33) (-5.89) (-5.96) 
ROAt-1 
-0.3167*** -0.3199*** -0.3026*** -0.3039*** 
(-3.4) (-3.43) (-7.26) (-7.28) 
LOSSt-1 
-0.0026 -0.0035 0.0210** 0.0209** 
(-0.1) (-0.14) (1.98) (1.96) 
SIZEt-1 
0.3519*** 0.3521*** 0.3547*** 0.3562*** 
(48.45) (48.49) (109.89) (110.54) 
LEVt-1 
0.2445*** 0.2443*** 0.1563*** 0.1556** 
(4.66) (4.65) (6.66) (6.62) 
GRWt-1 
-0.0275 -0.0274 -0.0145* -0.0144* 
(-1.41) (-1.41) (-1.75) (-1.73) 
EXPRATIOt-1 
-0.0499* -0.0500* 0.0066 0.0063 
(-1.89) (-1.90) (0.56) (0.53) 
LIQt-1 
-0.00224 -0.00224 -0.00496*** -0.00493*** 
(-0.8) (-0.80) (-3.55) (-3.53) 
INVARt-1 
-0.02053 -0.02057 0.00674 0.0061 
(-0.38) (-0.38) (0.29) (0.26) 
MBt-1 
0.0463*** 0.04643*** 0.0545** 0.055*** 
(7.27) (7.29) (18.68) (18.83) 
OWNERt 
-0.19042*** -0.19028*** -0.1315*** -0.13128*** 
(-3.39) (-3.39) (-5.65) (-5.63) 
FORGIt 
0.24271*** 0.24261*** 0.36509*** 0.36998*** 
(3.32) (3.32) (10.78) (10.92) 
BIG4t 
0.13175*** 0.13214*** 0.11199*** 0.11332*** 
(7.87) (7.90) (16.06) (16.23) 
OPINOt-1 
-0.35837** -0.3606** -0.09678 -0.09635 
(-2.32) (-2.34) (-1.48) (-1.47) 
IND Included Included Included Included 
YD Included Included Included Included 
Adj. R2 0.7227 0.7227 0.7217 0.7218 
Obs. 2,157 2,157 11,578 11,578 
1) Notes: *, **, *** represent significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 4. Results of Hypothesis 1-2 
 Controlling for endogeneity (Sample 1) 
Non-controlling for endogeneity 
(Sample 2) 
 Coefficient (t-stat.) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat.) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat.) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat.) 
Intercept -1.7058
*** -1.7068*** -2.1912*** -2.2347*** 
(-5.52) (-5.52) (-16.06) (-16.38) 
lnNASF 0.0016  0.0065
***  
(1.41)  (11.55)  
NAS_D  0.0206  0.0976
*** 
 (1.04)  (10.34) 
FIRST 0.0041 0.0037 0.0437
*** 0.0430*** 
(0.16) (0.14) (3.72) (3.66) 
ROAt-1 
-0.1928 -0.1958* -0.2066*** -0.2084*** 
(-1.62) (-1.65) (-3.81) (-3.84) 
LOSSt-1 
0.0389 0.0381 0.0532*** 0.0530*** 
(1.20) (1.18) (3.84) (3.82) 
SIZEt-1 
0.3388*** 0.3391*** 0.3466*** 0.3483*** 
(36.57) (36.62) (82.44) (83.03) 
LEVt-1 
0.0513 0.0511 -0.0094 -0.0102 
(0.77) (0.76) (-0.31) (-0.33) 
GRWt-1 
-0.0452* -0.0451* -0.0218** -0.0217** 
(-1.82) (-1.82) (-2.02) (-2.01) 
EXPRATIOt-1 
0.0062 0.0061 0.0417*** 0.0415*** 
(0.18) (0.18) (2.72) (2.70) 
LIQt-1 
0.000372 0.000364 -0.00499*** -0.00498*** 
(0.10) (0.10) (-2.74) (-2.74) 
INVARt-1 
0.04194 0.04184 0.00665 0.00598 
(0.60) (0.60) (0.22) (0.19) 
MBt-1 
0.02901*** 0.02914*** 0.04793*** 0.0485*** 
(3.57) (3.59) (12.61) (12.75) 
OWNERt 
-0.19173*** -0.19169*** -0.0957*** -0.09559*** 
(-2.68) (-2.67) (-3.16) (-3.15) 
FORGIt 
0.1264 0.12662 0.16266*** 0.16823*** 
(1.36) (1.36) (3.69) (3.81) 
BIG4t 
0.30784*** 0.30848 0.2615*** 0.26287*** 
(14.41) (14.45)*** (28.79) (28.92) 
OPINOt-1 
-0.25469 -0.25675 -0.02889 -0.02867 
(-1.29) (-1.30) (-0.34) (-0.34) 
IND Included Included Included Included 
YD Included Included Included Included 
Adj. R2 0.6331 0.6330 0.6264 0.6255 
Obs. 2,157 2,157 11,578 11,578 
1) Notes: *, **, *** represent significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 5. Results of Hypothesis 1-3 
 Controlling for endogeneity 
(Sample 1) 
Non-controlling for endogeneity 
(Sample 2) 
 Coefficient 
(t-stat.) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat.) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat.) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat.) 
Intercept 0.2778
*** 0.2784*** 0.1708*** 0.1716*** 
(4.94) (4.95) (7.42) (7.47) 
lnNASF -0.0001  -0.0003
**  
(-0.48)  (-2.18)  
NAS_Dt 
 -0.0021  -0.0048** 
 (-0.48)  (-2.49) 
SIZEt 
-0.0113*** -0.0113*** -0.0070*** -0.0071*** 
(-5.05) (-5.06) (-7.61) (-7.66) 
LEVt 
0.0491*** 0.0491*** 0.0362*** 0.0361*** 
(3.90) (3.90) (7.28) (7.27) 
GRWt 
0.0042 0.0042 0.0024 0.0024 
(0.78) (0.78) (0.98) (0.98) 
MBt 
-0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0012 -0.0012 
(-0.76) (-0.76) (-1.64) (-1.64) 
ROAt 
0.4221*** 0.4221*** 0.4017*** 0.4018*** 
(21.10) (21.10) (47.62) (47.63) 
OWNERt 
-0.0304*** -0.0304* -0.0250*** -0.0250*** 
(-1.90) (-1.90) (-4.03) (-4.02) 
FORGIt 
0.0060 0.0060 -0.0355*** -0.0355*** 
(0.29) (0.29) (-3.91) (-3.91) 
BIG4t 
0.0029 0.00284 -0.00132 -0.00128 
(0.60) (0.60) (-0.71) (-0.69) 
KOSPIt 
0.0098* 0.00978 0.00611 0.00615*** 
(1.81) (1.81) (2.81) (2.83) 
IND Included Included Included Included 
YD Included Included Included Included 
Adj. R2 0.1796 0.1796 0.1797 0.1798 
Obs. 2,157 2,157 11,578 11,578 
1) Notes: *, **, *** represent significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
Previous studies did not provide consistent results for how simultaneous provision of audit and non-audit services by 
an independent auditor to a client company affects audit quality. Researchers have identified endogeneity in the 
research method as the primary reason. Therefore, this study conducted analysis comprehensively using empirical 
data and research methods contrasting with existing studies in order to address the controversy related to 
endogeneity in effects of non-audit service by the same independent auditor with audit quality. This study used audit 
compensation and abnormal accruals variables simultaneously, and audit time variable using empirical data from 
Korean clients for comprehensive analysis. In addition, in order to control for endogeneity, the audit quality variable 
between before and after non-audit service is provided for companies which received non-audit service only. 
 
Study results found that the non-audit service meaningfully affects audit service quality before controlling for 
endogeneity. However, after controlling for endogeneity, the same independent auditor providing non-audit service 
did not affect the audit service quality. In other words, it was found that the non-audit service did not affect the 
quality of external audit after endogeneity from self-selection bias is removed and the homogeneity of samples is 
ensured by comparing the audit quality before and after the non-audit service was provided for companies at least 
once from the same independent auditor. Furthermore, this result was consistent using all audit compensation 
variables of audit quality, abnormal accruals and audit time variable. 
 
Result of this study are differentiated from previous studies as it selects companies which receive non-audit service 
and controls for endogeneity by comparing the audit quality variable before and after non-audit service is provided 
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for the same company. Furthermore, this study uses audit time data specifically disclosed in Korea. This study has 
meaningful implications for policies which can regulate the simultaneous provision of non-audit and audit services 
using the same independent auditor. 
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